Europe’s Sahel Dilemma
Rethinking the EU’s Role in West Africa
From Brussels to Paris, African politics tends to attract European attention only when it affects strategic interests such as migration, terrorism, access to resources, or geopolitical competition. Over the past five years, one issue in particular has dominated policy discussions and headlines: the emergence of a “coup belt” stretching across the Sahel.
Since 2020, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have all experienced military coups that ended elected governments. The new regimes have promised to break away from Western-aligned predecessors, expel French forces, and build partnerships with new allies, most notably Russia and China.
A New Bloc in the Sahel
In 2024, the three juntas formalised their cooperation by creating the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) under the leadership of Captain Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso, Colonel Assimi Goïta of Mali, and General Abdourahamane Tchiani of Niger. The alliance represents a clear departure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional organisation strongly supported by the European Union.
Officially, the AES aims to strengthen cooperation in security, economic development, and cultural exchange. In practice, however, the bloc reflects a larger political and ideological project that seeks to redefine power and legitimacy in West Africa.
A Three-Pronged Message
Observers note that the AES serves not only as a policy framework but also as a political message directed toward three distinct audiences.
First, domestic publics. Across the Sahel, citizens have grown frustrated with insecurity, poverty, and unfulfilled democratic promises. Anti-French demonstrations have become a regular occurrence in Ouagadougou, Bamako, and Niamey. The AES leaders have used this anger to present themselves as defenders of national pride and sovereignty.
Second, Western governments. The bloc challenges the influence of the EU and ECOWAS by positioning itself as an alternative regional model, one that operates without European oversight or democratic conditions.
Third, non-Western powers. Seeking to fill the vacuum left by Europe and gain access to valuable resources, Russia and China have positioned themselves as partners of equality and mutual respect in their relations with African governments, while simultaneously exploiting Europe’s colonial legacy. Meanwhile, EU states continue to struggle to rebuild trust and credibility with the AES countries. Yet not all is lost: the EU and several of its member states still have an opportunity to foster constructive and forward-looking relations with these new leaders.
Russia’s presence in the Sahel, first through the Wagner Group and now under the name Africa Corps, has expanded since 2021. Yet its impact has been limited. A 2025 Human Rights Watch report documented abuses against civilians in Mali, while the number of terrorist attacks across the region has continued to rise.
This situation presents a dilemma for Europe. Counterterrorism remains the top security priority for the AES regimes, and it is one area where the EU still has both experience and credibility. Italy’s MISIN mission in Niger, which trains local forces to combat terrorism and human trafficking, is often cited as a successful example of pragmatic cooperation. Renewed engagement, however, would inevitably mean supporting the survival of military regimes that openly reject European norms of democracy.
Recalibrating Europe’s Strategy
With ECOWAS weakened and French influence at its lowest point in decades, Brussels faces an urgent need to rethink its approach. Isolating the AES could deepen its dependence on Moscow and Beijing, while a more flexible strategy might reopen channels of dialogue.
One promising path could be a shift toward targeted bilateral engagement. Smaller EU member states, less associated with colonial history, might be able to build pragmatic relationships without provoking strong anti-European reactions. Denmark’s recent outreach to Burkina Faso has already been received positively, and similar initiatives could help Europe regain a foothold in the region.
A Regional Power in the Making
Combined, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger would rank as West Africa’s fourth-largest economy and second-most populous bloc. Their growing coordination, whether in security or diplomacy, signals that the AES is becoming a lasting regional actor rather than a short-lived alliance of convenience.
The emergence of the AES marks a new phase in Africa’s relationship with the West. It reflects a desire among military leaders to assert sovereignty, secure legitimacy at home, and diversify partnerships abroad. How the European Union responds—whether through isolation or engagement —will determine the extent of its influence in West Africa for years to come.
Author: A.S.
