Eurocentrism And The Illusion Of European Security:A Call For Global Reassessment

Malaury Vidon - 24/03/2025

INTRODUCTION

    For centuries, empires believed that peace could only be achieved through strength—a belief famously captured in the adage “Si vis pacem, para bellum”, often attributed to the Roman writer Vegetius. This mindset shaped the Roman Empire’s military doctrine and continues to echo in security thinking today. Yet, in the wake of World War II’s trauma, Western nations gradually abandoned this principle, convinced that peace was now a given. For decades, Western Europe believed it had secured a lasting peace, convinced that war was a relic of the past. The European project was built on this belief that economic integration and shared democratic values would make war obsolete, at least on the continent. Then came Ukraine, and panic set in.

The unthinkable had happened: war had returned to Europe. But was war ever truly gone, or had Western Europe simply chosen to look away? While conflicts raged in other parts of the world, Europe saw them as distant crises, unrelated to its own security. This phenomenon was further amplified by the shift in U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration, which questioned long-standing alliances and raised doubts about the reliability of American defense commitments. European nations, who had long relied on the United States as the cornerstone of their security, were forced to confront the uncomfortable reality that the foundation of their defense was no longer as stable as it once seemed. This article does not seek to dwell on the past but rather to examine how Europe, through a deeply Eurocentric lens, has failed to acknowledge the reality of a world where the West is no longer as central as it once was. By questioning how Eurocentric thinking has shaped Western Europe's perception of security, we can better understand the limits of this perspective and why it leaves the European countries dangerously unprepared for the geopolitical challenges of today.

First, we will briefly define the concept of Eurocentrism. Then, we will analyze why this perspective poses a challenge to European security. Finally, we will propose solutions to mitigate this phenomenon.

WHAT IS EUROCENTRISM?

    First things first, we must begin by defining the concept of Eurocentrism. In her article, Capan define Eurocentrism as a system of knowledge that presents Europe as the origin of all progressive developments, establishing spatio-temporal hierarchies where Europe is seen as temporally ahead of everywhere else (2020). This approach raises several issues when it comes to security. Nyman argues that Eurocentrism imposes significant limitations on international security studies. He explains that this perspective views international relations and global affairs through a Western-centric lens, one shaped by the history, culture, and values of the West (2023). This framework presents the West as superior, more developed, and more civilized (Hobson, 2012). Fukuyama also touches upon this, noting how 19th-century Europeans often equated progress with the advancement of democracy, a confidence that was later shaken when they encountered the non-European world (1992). As a result, the Eurocentric perspective has deeply influenced how European nations conceptualize international security, which in turn helps explain their unpreparedness and shock when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

One may argue that it is not entirely irrational for European countries to adopt a Eurocentric perspective on international relations and security. However, building an effective defense strategy requires a deep understanding of potential adversaries, which means integrating their perspectives into strategic thinking. The Western understanding of international security is far from being universal and failing to recognize this has profound consequences.

THE PERCEPTION OF SECURITY AS A UNIVERSAL VALUE

    In her article, Bilgin highlights that security concepts are deeply shaped by local history, culture, ideology, and political systems, resulting in hybrid models that differ significantly from the Eurocentric framework (2010). By treating its own understanding of security as the universal norm, Western Europe risks overlooking these variations, leading to misinterpretations and ineffective policies when dealing with non-Western actors. For example, Barkawi and Laffey argue that the historical geographies underpinning security studies systematically misrepresent the role of the Global South and distort Europe’s perceived place in world politics (2006). This Eurocentric perspective frequently assumes that Europe and the West occupy a central role in global history and contemporary affairs, an assumption that then shapes Western approaches to international security.

This mindset is also closely linked to the post-World War II power structure, which positioned the United States and its allies at the center of international relations. The West’s dominance was further cemented after the Cold War, with little real challenge until recently. Today, however, the emergence of rival powers is forcing a reassessment of this long-standing order. This shift is particularly evident in institutions like the United Nations, where the Security Council’s structure (three permanent Western members versus only two from the rest of the world) reflects an outdated global power dynamic. The Western security model has, until now, rested on two pillars: the unquestioned supremacy of NATO, led by the United States, and the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Yet as global power dynamics shift, this once-stable framework may no longer be sufficient.

This passivity strongly echoes Fukuyama’s End of History thesis (1992). While Fukuyama’s argument primarily addresses political and social evolution rather than security, his central claim remains relevant: he posits that liberal democracy represents the pinnacle of human ideological and socio-political development, the final form of governance. While this notion is far from universally accepted, it embodies a Eurocentric belief that the West has already achieved an ideal state, one that the rest of the world should strive to emulate.

This assumption, that so-called "universal" values such as democracy, human rights, and freedoms of speech and press, are inherently Western implies that the Western model is not merely an example but the standard. However, this model is just one among many, with its own strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, the literature highlights a strong tendency to universalize Western security concepts. Nyman argues that international security studies tell a story where security, often narrowly defined as the protection of the state from external (military) threats in an anarchic international system, is presented as a universal concept, even though it is deeply shaped by the U.S. post-war and Cold War context (p. 676, 2023).

REFORMING AN ESTABLISHED ORDER

    Thus, certain policies and shifts in mindset appear necessary to address contemporary geopolitical challenges. In their work, Nayak and Selbin argue that rejecting Eurocentrism also means exploring new ways of thinking about international relations, drawing from multiple perspectives beyond the West. They explain that decentering international relations involves: “imagining how else we might speak about, experience, and change the world in ways that are not merely circumscribed by, or a response to, or otherwise signified by the center” (p.9, 2010). By moving away from a Eurocentric viewpoint, we open up the potential for alternative solutions to international security problems, solutions that account for the histories, cultures, and political systems of non-Western regions.

Other possible solutions include better integrating alternative perspectives on peace and security into international forums, along with incorporating courses on diverse security concepts in military academies and universities. Finally, a bold but perhaps less realistic move, given its rooted structure, would be a reform of the United Nations Security Council to ensure a more balanced representation of global powers. By creating a more equitable decision-making process, the Security Council could better reflect the geopolitical realities of the 21st century. However, such reforms would require overcoming significant political and institutional resistance, particularly from countries that benefit from the existing structure.

CONCLUSION

    For decades, Europe believed it had secured lasting peace, but recent conflicts have proven otherwise. The war in Ukraine has dispelled the illusion that Europe is immune to large-scale conflict. This crisis highlights a fundamental issue: Western nations have long viewed security through a Eurocentric lens, assuming that their model of peace and stability was universal. As a result, they were unprepared when global power dynamics shifted, exposing the limitations of this perspective.

Moving forward, Europe must expand its understanding of security. This means acknowledging the perspectives of non-Western nations and integrating them into policy and strategic thinking. Of course, shifting away from Eurocentrism won’t happen overnight. It requires a willingness to question long-held assumptions and embrace alternative viewpoints. This is not about weakening Western influence but rather about adapting to a world where power is no longer concentrated in one region. If Europe fails to make this shift, it risks being unprepared for the challenges ahead. The world is rapidly changing, and so must our understanding of security. Europe’s response will determine whether it remains relevant or becomes increasingly isolated.

The question is: will Europe recognize the need for change, or will it continue to overlook realities it has long ignored? The time for change is now, Europe’s future depends on it.